Bed Loss & Bedlam (part 2)
A look at bed occupancy within NHS England over the last 13 years
In part 1 of this series I derived a variable I am calling Bed Loss Fraction (BLF), this being mean daily proportional bed occupancy across service providers within NHS England in comparison to the maximum mean daily beds occupied over the period 2020/w1 – 2022/w33 (128,079 beds).
We observed a worrisome BLF peak of 0.59 (59%) during 2020/w14 (w/e 3 April 2020) and noted the rapidity with which bed loss was achieved. Hailed as a necessary preparation for the computer-predicted incoming mega-wave of seriously sick folk, the irony is that the government took the decision to sacrifice hospitalised grannies whilst blaming folk for not wearing a mask (futile) or standing 2.0m from the next person in the queue (also futile). The mega-wave never came and bed occupancy crept back to ‘normal’ levels over a period of two years, with bed loss falling to its half-life value of 0.30 (30%) over a period of 8 - 9 weeks.
BLF & COVID
The relationship between BLF and COVID occupied beds is interesting, so I suggest we get the coffee on the stove, open something to nibble and have a squizz at this dual time series plot:
In the beginning we observe extreme bed loss and a modest wave of bed-ridden COVID cases. At this point I feel I ought to remind readers once again that a bed-ridden COVID case isn’t necessarily bed-ridden because of COVID. What we have here is a count of PTBs (positive test beds) whereby anybody in bed for any reason will count as a COVID ‘case’ if a single test result turns out to be positive. Thus, positive-testing mothers-to-be in maternity units will become COVID ‘cases’, as will those unfortunate enough to require hospitalisation in a mental health facility.
Substantial bed loss paired with elevated PTB counts will result in impoverished hospitals that will be chock-a-block full of COVID ‘cases’ and little else. As one senior nurse remarked to a disgruntled family whose relative was being treated like a ping pong ball, “all wards are COVID wards”. And so it was, and absurd protocols will have ensured any remaining staff will have been stretched to the limit managing yet another positive test result rather than thinking about symptomatically sick folk (like we traditionally do with disease). This is not to say there weren’t any severe cases - there most certainly were - but this wasn’t the norm. Several nurses have confided that their unit tested patients endlessly until they got a positive result, after which the standard of care declined as newly found ‘cases’ were wheeled into a corner. Talk to a Senior House Officer about any of this and they’ll snort through their nose. Evidence-based medicine isn’t what it was.
Modelling Strategy
But I digress! Back in part 1 we considered cross-correlation function plots for BLF with both all cause and non-COVID death and discovered a delayed correlation of the order of 3 – 4 weeks. We cogitated on whether this was evidence of dangerous discharge given that the same lagged correlation was observed for non-COVID death. Whilst it is reasonable to assume non-COVID death rules out the possibility of SARS-tinted confounding factors, there is always that nagging doubt that non-COVID death doesn’t actually mean non-COVID death in much the same manner as COVID death doesn’t necessarily mean a death due to COVID (or even with COVID for that matter).
As an analyst with 38 years of experience I find myself in a strange and surreal landscape these days where nothing is as it seems, thus I am going to reach for my big spanner of ARIMA time series modelling again to see if this can shed any light. In this regard we shall start with a base model for the prediction of non-COVID death over the period 2020/w6 – 2022/w33, for that is the period for which I have 100% data capture.
There are two ways of going about this:
Modelling of the T4253H smoothed excess non-COVID weekly death count time series.
Modelling of the T4253H smoothed non-COVID weekly death count time series with the T4253H smoothed 5-year (2015-2019) mean baseline series as a covariate proxy for seasonal fluctuations.
I shall try both methods to see if agreement can be reached (this being a jolly good thing) and shall use the case detection rate series (rolling 7-day COVID cases per 100 virus tests, a.k.a. CDR) as an independent variable to test for reliability of non-COVID death classification. Once this confounding factor is nailed down I can enter BLF into the statistical models to see if this explains anything. If it does we’ll be a step closer to proof of dangerous discharge.
Bed Loss & Death – model #1
Herewith the best fitting ARIMA model for the prediction of T4253H smoothed excess non-COVID death that I can muster as things stand this morning. I appreciate that T4253H smoothed excess non-COVID death is a bit of a mouthful but it’s all very simple really… I’m having a look at non-COVID deaths since the pandemic began that have been adjusted for seasonality (hence excess) and administrative hiccoughs (hence smoothing):
The first feature to notice in this table is inclusion of the time series for CDR as a statistically significant predictor of excess non-COVID death (p<0.001). This means the designation of non-COVID is likely in error for a number of deaths since we’ve had to soak up a bit of variance using CDR as a proxy for disease prevalence. The coefficient of determination for the intermediate model (dependent + CDR) fetched-up at r-square = 0.064, which indicates that 6.4% of the variation in excess non-COVID deaths is explained by variation in the case detection rate. This gives us some idea of the level of erroneous certification, the positive coefficient of 50.315 suggesting that a number of non-COVID deaths were missed owing to false positive reporting (and thus need to be added back).
The second, and arguably most important feature to notice in this table, is inclusion of the time series for BLF as a statistically significant predictor of excess non-COVID death when assigned a lag of 2 weeks (p<0.001). The positive coefficient of +1774.312 gives us a handle on the impact of bed loss over the period 2020/w6 – 2022/w33, such that a 50% loss in beds is associated with 50% x 1774 = 887 additional weekly deaths some 2 weeks later. Even a 5% loss in beds will yield 89 additional weekly deaths, this giving us some idea of just how super-saturated the NHS is at the best of times. If we apply this coefficient to the BLF curve expressed in part 1, then run out cumulative additional non-COVID deaths associated with bed loss, we arrive at this slide:
My modest ARIMA model indicates that the cumulative count of additional deaths associated with bed loss is currently standing at just over 26,000 deaths. We should note that these are true excess deaths; that is, they’re deaths adjusted for both seasonal effects and certification error. We should also note these are non-COVID deaths so represent only part of the sorry picture.
Model #1 Pudding
Here’s how well that modest first model tracks excess non-COVID death over time:
Bed Loss & Death – model #2
That’s quite a convincing fit and quite a shocking result to boot so we better look at what the second method yielded:
Here we have the engine room of a model designed to predict (smoothed) weekly counts for non-COVID death rather than excess non-COVID death. In this approach seasonality isn’t accounted for by subtracting a prior 5-year mean baseline à la mode but by using the baseline series as a covariate. This pops up with a coefficient of 0.346 and p-value of p=0.015, which suggests around a third of the weekly variation we see within the baseline series overlaps with weekly variation for non-COVID death.
Again, there is a need to incorporate a proxy for disease prevalence (CDR), this being highly statistically significant at p<0.001, and the coefficient of 42.975 is pleasingly similar to that derived for the first model (50.315). Multiply these coefficients by the values of the CDR series and you get some idea of the number of misclassified deaths due to false positive test results or physicians jumping to the wrong conclusion and calling a non-COVID death a COVID death. I shall cover this wrinkle in a future article.
This brings us once again to the time series for bed loss fraction, which once again drops out as a highly statistically significant predictor of non-COVID death when lagged by 2 weeks (p<0.001). We should note the similarity of the associated coefficient (1842.084) with that derived from the first model (1774.312), which is most pleasing. The pudding is also equally tasty:
Yes, But Is It Robust?
Some sharp subscribers will ask if BLF pops up as a statistically significant predictor of non-COVID death for other delay values. I can report that this is indeed so, with the model yielding p=0.772 for zero delay, p=0.023 for a 1 week delay, p<0.001 for a 2 week delay, p=0.003 for a 3 week delay, p<0.004 for a 4 week delay and p=0.105 for a 5 week delay. The effect is thus robust from weeks 1 through 4 and something we need to pay attention to even if the government and NHS top brass try to sweep the issue under the carpet. Closing beds kills folk, plain and simple; it ain’t exactly rocket science and neither does it require any stretch of the imagination.
Kettle On!








Super interesting!
Just as I was getting to the last few paragraphs of the post I realized that it might be the case that your model is predicting an output of a system. The system is sick people being treated by the nhs. Sick people come in and are processed by the "system" and leave in various states of repair. The output of the system is f(type of illness, number of nurses, number of doctors, number of patients at any given time, number of ICU beds, number of beds, etc.). For optimal performance, all of these pieces need to be in balance with one another. I believe you mentioned something about beds needing to be staffed in your previous article. Anyway, there must be some relationship between these variables and the outcomes.
It looks like you may have found a 50 thousand foot view of the working of the system as a function of beds. If the number of beds drives the number of staff, or vice versa, wouldn't that suggest that the number of staff should have a similar correspondence with outcomes?
Thank you for your excellent work John, this area has been troubling me for 2 years now. Back in summer of 2020 I became aware of this issue and decided to monitor it (not very competent with statistics) So digging out the figures back to 2008/2009 it was clear that bed numbers were being cut sharply. What worried me was the planned discharge of presumably sick patients during quarter one, and the effect this would have on those people.
One of the first things I noticed was that there were 60,000 fewer (all beds) occupied during the peak death period in 2020 than the last major “flu” 2008- 2009 (H1N1).
Focussing on acute and general beds which I thought more relevant than maternity/geriatric etc. Over 32,000 patients were ejected during quarter one, this led me to look into excess deaths in care and private homes. It was not at all surprising that during quarter 2, there were more than 25,000 excess deaths in care homes.
Deaths in private homes has been more difficult to find, I’ve written to ask for updates but told there are no plans to update figures from June 2021 - unless I make a bespoke request and pay for it!
Private homes excess deaths in In the full year of 2020, reached a staggering 37,373 recorded deaths. Around 96 per day, every day for a year! Last figure I have from January 2020 - June 2021 non Covid excess deaths were 54,718 that’s around 100 per day.
Trying to avoid speculation, it does pose questions about all these deaths and availability of beds. It also makes me think the reported “blanket DNRs” and use of certain drugs played a part.